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Abstract
We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for nurses in Zambia to test whether
career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. We randomize the offer of career
benefits at the recruitment stage. In line with common wisdom, treatment attracts less prosocial
applicants. However, the trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment
are more talented and equally pro-social. These are hired, and they perform better at every step of the
chain: they deliver more services, promote institutional childbirth, and reduce child malnutrition by
25% in the communities they serve.
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1 Introduction
Economic development entails the professionalization of public service delivery: qualified, career
professionals replace informal providers with strong connection to beneficiaries, willing to work for
little pay (Northcote and Trevelyan 1853; Weber 1922; North 1991).1 This shift fosters an identity
based on a career in the civil service, but agents with altruistic preferences towards beneficiaries
may be necessary for effective public service delivery (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Besley and Ghatak
2005; Prendergast 2007; Brehm and Gates 1999; Wilson 1989). To what extent does profession-
alization crowd out those who care most deeply about the beneficiaries, and what impact does it
have on welfare?2
This paper provides the first experimental evidence on whether these identities attract different
agents and whether this selection determines the effectiveness of service delivery. Does a career
in the civil service attract talent at the expense of pro-sociality? Does it draw in agents who
underperform relative to those attracted by “doing good”?3 Or does it attract agents who are
neither talented nor prosocial but attracted by the opportunity to extract rents? Understanding
the conditions under which such tradeoffs occur is critical to informing theory and to settling the
policy debate on whether rewards for service delivery agents should be kept low so as to screen out
individuals with no altruistic preferences.
We design a nationwide recruitment experiment to identify causal impacts on the applicant
pool, on the recruited agents, and on their performance. We collaborate with the Government
of Zambia as they formalize primary health care in remote rural areas by creating a new health
worker position in the civil service. This cadre is meant to replace informal service provision by
religious and other charitable organizations, thereby following the typical evolution of the modern
State. The stakes are high because, due to the shortage of medical staff, hiring effective agents can
make a great difference for the quality of health services and, ultimately, health outcomes in these
communities.
Our experiment varies the salience of a career in civil service at the recruitment stage, exploiting
the fact that this position is new to potential applicants. In control districts the recruitment
ads reflect the status quo before the new position, when local health services were provided by
individuals hired by NGOs or other charitable organizations. Helping the community is listed as
the main benefit and local agents are listed as peers. In treatment districts the ads are designed to
highlight the civil servant identity: career advancement is listed as the main benefit, and doctors and
nurses are listed as peers. Treatment and control differ only in the salience of career opportunities,
while all factors such as application requirements and earnings expectations are kept equal. To
1Weber (1922) stated “bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is dehumanized, the more completely
it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements
which escape calculation” (p. 975).
2This echoes the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on the job (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006).
3Ambition towards a career in public service, with both its ability to attract the most able but also the most
self-interested, has a long intellecutal history; ambition was used by Romans, as ambitio, exclusively to refer to those
in public life. In De officiis, Cicero referred to ambitio as a “malady” that can cause individuals to “lose sight of
their claims to justice,” but it is a malady that seems to draw “the greatest souls” and “most brilliant geniuses”.
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isolate the effect of selection on performance, we must sever the link between treatment and the
marginal return to effort on the job. To this end, all hired agents are given the same information
on career opportunities and social impact when they move to the same training school where they
are trained together for one year, before deployment. A survey administered before and after the
training program validates our design: before training treatment and control agents differ in the
perceived relevance of career benefits, but after training these perceptions converge.
The new health worker position effectively adds career opportunities to a job with social impact.
A simple conceptual framework makes precise that, in line with prevailing policy concerns, this
attracts applicants who are less pro-social but only conditional on a given level of talent. However,
since the outside option is increasing in talent, adding career benefits will draw in more talented
individuals and the marginal, most talented, applicant in both treatments will have the highest pro-
sociality. The treatment effect on recruited candidates will therefore depend on how candidates are
chosen from the pool. If applicants are drawn randomly, there might be a trade-off between talent
and pro-sociality. However, if only the most talented are hired, there will be no trade-off.
To evaluate the impact of treatment on the applicant pool and on selected candidates we collect
information on the skills and pro-sociality of every applicant. This exercise reveals that, in line
with common intuition, the average applicant in treatment is more talented and less pro-social. In
line with the theoretical intuition, however, the most talented applicants have the same, high, level
of pro-sociality. We show that the selection panels in both treatment and control always recruit the
most talented in their pool; as a result treatment recruits are more talented and equally prosocial.
To evaluate the impact of treatment on service delivery we combine three data sources: real
time data on service delivery in remote areas collected through a mobile platform, administrative
data on health facility utilization, and our own survey of household health practices and outcomes,
including immunization records and anthropometrics. This allows us to link the services delivered
by the newly recruited health workers to the outcomes of the households who receive those services
and, ultimately, their health impact.
We find that agents drawn by a career in the civil service are more effective at each step of
the causal chain from the inputs they provide to the outcomes of the recipients. They provide
more inputs (29% more household visits, twice as many community meetings) at the same cost.
They increase facility utilization rates: the number of women giving birth at the health center
is 30% higher, and the number of children undergoing health checks 24% higher, being weighed
22% higher, and receiving immunization against polio 20% higher. They improve a number of
health practices among the households they serve: breastfeeding and proper stool disposal increase
by 5pp and 12pp, deworming treatments by 15%, and the share of children on track with their
immunization schedule by 5pp (relative to a control mean of 5%). These changes are matched by
changes in health outcomes: the share of under 5s who are underweight falls by 5pp.
Taken together, these results indicate first, that the selection effect on performance in service
delivery is sizeable, and second, that offering a civil service position with career opportunities
attracts agents who deliver services with remarkable health impact in the communities. The fact
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that we observe consistently positive impacts from three distinct and entirely independent data
sources further strengthens our confidence in the findings.
In light of the evidence of poor bureaucratic performance in low income countries (Collier 2009;
Muralidharan et al. 2011) our findings suggest that this is not due to the fact that civil service
careers attract poor performers when these jobs are first created. In contrast, it must be that
once a bureaucracy, like any organization, has acquired low effort norms, it will attract agents who
enjoy those norms. This underscores the importance of making the organization congruent with
the mission advertised at the recruitment stage to ensure positive selection in the long run.
The study of how individuals sort into jobs according to their preferences, skills, and the jobs’
own attributes has a long tradition in economics (Roy 1951). More recently this has been enriched
by the study of job missions as a selection and motivation mechanism (Besley and Ghatak 2005)
and identity or self-image as components of preferences (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Bénabou and
Tirole 2011). Our findings provide empirical support to these contributions as we show that the
identity associated with the job affects those drawn to it and that this selection affects performance.
The fact that career opportunities affect performance through selection complements the recent
findings of Bertrand et al. (2016) that, on the intensive margin, better promotion prospects improve
the effectiveness of Indian civil servants. Our findings also complement a large literature on the
impact of financial incentives. On the selection margin, Dal Bó et al. (2013) and Deserranno (2014)
study the effect of earnings levels on the traits of applicants for government and NGO jobs4 while
several papers evaluate the effect of performance pay on the performance of agents after these
have been hired either for the delivery of health services (Ashraf et al. 2014; Miller et al. 2012;
Miller and Babiarz 2014; Celhay et al. 2015) or education (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011;
Duflo et al. 2012; Glewwe et al. 2010; Fryer 2013; Rockoff et al. 2012; Staiger and Rockoff 2010).
Our contribution is to provide the first experimental evidence that selection affects performance in
public services delivery. In particular, we show that job design, of which incentives are a component,
affects who sorts into these jobs in the first place, and that the effect of this selection on performance
is of the same order of magnitude as the largest incentive effects estimates.5,6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and research design.
Section 3 develops a conceptual framework to make precise the trade-off between talent and pro-
sociality, and Section 4 tests for it in the applicant pool and among recruited candidates. Section 5
evaluates the treatment effect on performance in delivering health services. Section 6 evaluates the
4Dal Bó et al. (2013) find that higher salaries for civil service jobs attracts better qualified candidates with the
same level of pro-social preferences. Deserranno (2014) finds that expectations of higher earnings discourage pro-
social candidates from applying for an NGO job that encompasses both commercial and health promotion activities.
While consistent with these selection effects, our experiment focuses on measuring the effect of selection on agents’
performance and beneficiaries’ outcomes, which encompass the effect of all the attributes that determine effectiveness.
5There is a corresponding literature that studies the same issues in the private sector. This literature stresses the
importance of the effect of incentives on selection but empirical studies focus on incentives on the job (Lazear and
Oyer, 2012; Oyer and Schaefer, 2011).
6Rothstein (2015) uses a model-based approach that simulates the selection effect of alternative teachers’ contracts.
He finds that bonus policies have small effects on selection while reductions in tenure rates accompanied by substantial
salary increases and high firing rates can have larger effects.
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treatment effect on facility utilization, health behaviors, and health outcomes. Section 7 concludes
with a discussion of external validity, welfare implications, and general equilibrium effects relevant
for program scale-up.
2 Context and Research Design
2.1 Context: health services in rural communities
Delivering health services to remote rural areas is challenging at every level of development because
trained medical staff are reluctant to be posted there and turnover rates are high (Lopez et al.
2015).7 In Zambia, the average health post (the first-level government health facility) had 1.5
staff from the Ministry of Health, including those not permanently based there. The government
community health assistant (CHA) position was created as a solution to this challenge. The position
is effectively a formalization of existing informal community health workers who are employed, often
as volunteers, by religious and other non-profit organizations.8
In 2010, the program’s first year, the Government sought to recruit, train, and deploy two health
workers to each of 167 communities. The main task of CHAs is to visit households and refer them
to health facilities as needed. The job requires both medical and social skills (World Health Orga-
nization 2006). Medical skills include weighing, taking vital signs, filling out patient registries, and
determining whether a patient is pregnant. Social skills include counselling, supporting, advising,
and educating patients and other lay people.
Government-funded community health worker programs vary in the extent to which they in-
tegrate the health workers into the civil service. At one extreme there are programs that mimic
the informal model with financing provided by the government and all other decisions including
hiring, monitoring, and firing left to the community. At the other extreme is the model adopted in
Zambia where health workers are a cadre of civil servants and can advance to higher-ranked and
better paid cadres. The pay gradient is steep as the starting monthly wage is USD 290 for health
workers, USD 530 for entry-level nurses, USD 615 for environmental health technicians, and USD
1,625 for resident doctors.9 Promotion into higher-ranked cadres within the Ministry requires addi-
7The U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration estimates that approximately sixty million Americans
live in medically underserved, under-resourced communities with a shortage of primary care physicians (PCPs),
dental, or mental health providers, and with a population-to-physician ratio greater than 3,500 to one. This ratio is
similar in low income countries like Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Gabon, and Botswana.
8The history of community health work goes back at least to the early 17th century, when a shortage of doctors
in Russia led to training community volunteers in providing basic medical care to military personnel. This training
later became the foundation of China’s “barefoot doctors,” laypeople who sometimes could not afford shoes but were
trained to meet primary health needs in rural areas, and then became widespread in Latin America, in underserved
areas in the United States, and, more recently, across Africa (La Familia Sana Program 1992; Perez and Martinez
2008). The original programs emphasized community self-reliance and participation. Like much of informal public
services delivery, for example in the United Kingdom in the 18th and 19th centuries, these are provided by religious
institutions, grassroots movements, and, more recently, non-governmental organizations. For this reason, however,
they are often uncoordinated, lower-skilled efforts.
9At the time of the launch of the recruitment process in September 2010, the Government had not yet determined
how much the health workers would be formally remunerated. Accordingly, the posters did not display any information
about compensation. Although the health worker wage was unknown to applicants at the time of application (indeed,
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tional training (for example, nursing or medical school). Being part of the civil service, the health
workers are eligible for “in-service training,” meaning that they attend school as a serving officer
and the government pays the tuition for all of their training. The official policy of the Ministry
is to periodically ask the district medical officers to nominate a number of candidates on merit,
but there is no mechanical link between quantitative measures of performance (say the number of
visits that a health worker makes) and nominations. Promotions to higher cadres are therefore
not automatic, but the expected payoff is high even with low success rates, especially because job
opportunities that allow for a career in central government are rare in the remote communities from
which the health workers are recruited.
The Government chose the latter model in the hope of attracting agents with strong technical
skills to do community work. Nevertheless they were fully aware that the focus on career advance-
ment could have backfired by crowding out applicants motivated to help the community.10 The
possibility of this trade-off led to the experiment we describe below.
2.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment aims to assess whether a career in civil service attracts talent at the expense of
pro-sociality, and whether this selection affects performance. This is relevant to evaluate the role of
selection in public service delivery beyond health services in low income countries, as the concern
that material rewards attract the wrong types is pervasive. The key challenge is to separate the
effect of selection from the effect of incentives on the job. We tackle this in two steps: the first
opens the selection channel, and the second shuts down the incentive channel.
Experimental Design, Step I: Opening the Selection Channel
To open the selection channel we use the recruitment posters and the information materials dis-
tributed to health officers. In each community, paper advertisements for the job were posted in
local public spaces, such as schools, churches, and the health post itself. District health officials
were responsible for ensuring that the recruitment posters were posted.
To ensure that the recruitment process was carried out in a uniform manner across all the
communities, the Government included detailed written instructions in the packets containing the
recruitment materials (posters, applications, etc.) that were distributed to district health officials
(see Appendix F).
unknown even to the Government), applicants would likely have been able to infer an approximate wage, or at least
an ordinal wage ranking, based on the “community health” job description and the relatively minimal educational
qualifications required—both of which would intuitively place the job below facility-based positions in compensation.
In Section 2.2, we present evidence against the hypothesis that wage perceptions may have differed by treatment.
10Mr. Mwila, then Human Resources Director at the Ministry of Health, expressed this trade-off clearly when he
asked us: “What is going to happen now that they (potential health workers) will see themselves as civil servants?
Will they be connected to the community?”
6
The treatment poster stresses the civil service identity of the new position. It lists as the main
benefit of the job the opportunity to ascend the civil-service career ladder to higher and better-paid
positions such as environmental health technician, nurse, clinical officer, and doctor. This incentive
is summarized in a bold caption stating, “Become a community health worker to gain skills and
boost your career!” The poster also explicitly leverages a sense of belonging to the civil service by
stating “become a highly trained member of Zambia’s health care system”. Finally it sets “experts
in medical fields” as the peer group.
The control poster uses the standard approach of recruiting community health workers, stress-
ingthe social identity of the position by making salient community impact such as “[gaining] the
skills you need to prevent illness and promote health for your family and neighbors”. The message
is summarized in a caption stating, “Want to serve your community? Become a community health
worker!” Finally, it lists local health post staff as the peer group candidates can expect to interact
with.
Three points are of note. First, the social identity poster functions as control because the status
quo community health worker jobs do not offer career opportunities. Second, treatment and control
posters have exactly the same structure except the wording of the benefits. We chose this over a
“neutral” control poster with no benefits whatsoever because in that case, the treatment effect
would conflate the effect of interest with the effect of advertising benefits per se. While this might
be of intrinsic interest, it would not allow us to answer the more general question of how agents
who are attracted by a career in the civil service differ from those attracted by social impact and
how this selection affects performance. Third it is important to note that in these communities
government jobs are scarce and the majority of the eligibles are either not in paid employment or
in jobs below their skill level. In this context, therefore, a poster advertising a government job is
likely to be highly visible.
Since recruitment was organized by district officials, we randomized treatment at the district
level in order to maximize compliance with the experimental assignment, evenly splitting the 48
districts into two groups. This implies that each district official is only exposed to one treatment and
is unaware of the other. As district officials are the main source of information for aspiring health
workers, randomization at the district level minimizes the risk of contamination. Randomization
at the district level also mitigates the risk of informational spillovers between communities, as
the distance between health posts in different districts is large. Random assignment of the 48
districts is stratified by province and average district-level educational attainment.11 To ensure
11We stratify by the proportion of adults in the district who have a high school diploma, as reported in the most
recent Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, conducted by the Central Statistical Office four years prior in 2006. We
sort districts by province and, within each province, by high school graduation rate. Within each sorted, province-
specific list of districts, we take each successive pair of districts and randomly assign one district in the pair to the
career opportunities treatment and the other to the control group. For provinces with an odd number of districts,
we pool the final unpaired districts across provinces, sort by educational attainment, and randomize these districts
in the same pair-wise manner.
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compliance with the randomization protocol, we worked closely with the Government to standardize
the information given to the district officials to organize the recruitment process.12
Table A.1 reports balance tests on three sets of variables that can affect the supply of health
workers, the demand for their services, and their working conditions. Overall, Table A.1 shows
that the new health workers are recruited from similar areas and will work in similar areas. Besides
showing balance between treatment and control, this exercise is useful to understand labor markets
in rural Zambia. Two findings are of note. First only 4.4% of the population have the necessary
credentials (grade 12 education) to apply. Second, and more strikingly, the majority (54%) of the
eligible were either out of work or in unpaid employment over the past twelve months.13 Among the
46% engaged in income generating activities (either as employees or self-employed), fewer than one
third are employed in high skill occupations (such as teachers, which account for 9% of the eligible
population), and about half are employed in low skill occupations, mostly in agriculture, which
accounts for 18% of the eligible population. Taken together, the evidence suggests that, despite
their educational achievements, the majority of the eligible population is either out of work or
employed in occupations below their skill level. Given the scarcity of skilled jobs, the program can
draw talent from these areas without crowding out other skilled occupations. Indeed, the program
might have the added benefit of creating job opportunities in these communities. We return to this
issue in the Conclusion.
Experimental Design, Step II: Closing the Incentive Channel
To close down the incentive channel, all successful applicants were offered career opportunities on
the job. After being recruited, all agents train together for one year, during which they receive
the same information about the career opportunities they were entitled to as civil servants. As
treatment and control health workers face the same incentives once hired, performance differences,
if any, are attributable to selection.
The experiment aims to create differences in career opportunities at the application stage and
then to eliminate these differences after candidates have been hired. To check whether it succeeded,
we ask all agents about perceived benefits of the job when they first arrive at the training school and
then again twenty months later, that is, after they have completed the one year training. To elicit
this information, we give each health worker a bag of 50 beans and ask them to allocate the beans
12District officials are given a packet containing 10 recruitment posters and 40 application forms for each health
post and are asked to distribute each packet to the respective health center and, from there, to ensure that recruitment
posters are posted, application forms are made available, and so forth. We conduct a series of follow-up calls over
several weeks to the district point-persons to ensure that the recruitment process is conducted as planned. To
reinforce the treatment, we also include a basic written script that the district officials are invited to use to inform
health centers and neighborhood health committees on the health worker program and recruitment process. In
the career opportunities treatment, the script describes the new program as follows: “This is an opportunity for
qualified Zambians to obtain employment and to advance their health careers. Opportunities for training to advance
to positions such as Nurse and Clinical Officer may be available in the future.” In contrast, in the control group, the
script states, “This is an opportunity for local community members to become trained and serve the health needs of
their community.” (see Appendix F).
13The 28% who were out of work are either unemployed (13%), housewives (7.5%), or full time students (8.5%).
Most (65%) of the unpaid jobs are in agriculture. These are balanced across treatments.
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to different cards describing potential benefits of the job. This method has two desirable features:
(i) it forces respondents to take into account the trade-off between different benefits, namely that
giving more weight to one benefit necessarily implies that other benefits will be given less weight;
(ii) it allows us to test whether the treatment affected other benefits besides career advancement
and community service.
There are two sources of potential desirability bias, which might affect the magnitude of the
treatment effects but not their sign. First, the fact that respondents say what they think the
enumerators want to hear based on the information given on the posters does not invalidate this
exercise; the aim of the exercise is precisely to test whether the information they have matches that
given on the posters. Second, the fact that this is a community based position, named “Community
Health Worker,” might lead the health workers to overstate community benefits. This will bias
the share put on community benefits upwards and the difference between treatments downwards,
making it less likely for us to be able to detect a difference between treatment and control. This
should be kept in mind when interpreting the magnitudes reported below.
The answers tabulated in Table A.2 show that differences in the reported benefits reported by
the health workers when they first arrive at the training school match those advertised in treatment
and control posters and then disappear after the health workers are exposed to the training program.
Table A.2, Panel A, shows that service to the community is listed as the main benefit in both groups.
This might truly reflect preferences or be inflated by desirability bias as discussed above. Despite
the fact that this biases treatment effects towards zero, we find that the treatment group places 38%
more weight on career opportunities (p=.002) and lower weight on both “allows me to serve the
community” and “earn respect and status in the community” (p=.050 and p=.048, respectively).
All other benefits are balanced across groups, suggesting that the poster did not convey different
expectations about pay or the nature of the job.
Table A.2, Panel B, shows that the answers converge after exposure to training and that there
are no significant differences between the two groups. In line with the fact that control health
workers receive information about career opportunities during training, the weight they give to
career opportunities rises by 25%, while the weight they give to service to the community falls to
17%. In contrast, treatment health workers, who receive no new information during training, do
not change their answers.
The experimental design allows us to identify the effect of career opportunities on performance
through selection if the salience of career opportunities at the recruitment stage does not affect the
agents’ behavior directly once the real career opportunities are known by both treatment and control
health workers. This assumption fails if control agents react to the difference between advertised
and actual benefits, rather than to the benefits themselves. If control agents value career benefits
this will bias the treatment estimates downwards as they might respond to the positive surprise
by working harder. Symmetrically, estimates will be biased upwards if control agents dislike career
benefits or dislike finding out that the actual value of career opportunities is larger than the value
advertised. Note that in this case, agents for whom the participation constraint is met ex-ante but
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not ex-post would drop out once hired. For instance, Deserranno (2014) finds that NGO health
promoters who receive a negative surprise on earnings are 14pp more likely to drop out than those
who do not over a two year period. In contrast, the drop out rate of control CHAs was zero over
the same period, and only 3% of those who started training did not complete it.
3 Framework
Potential applicants choose whether to apply comparing utility as a CHA against their outside
option. All CHAs receive material benefits equal to M ; these accrue to all agents regardless
of performance. In addition, individuals differ in ability (a) and social preferences towards the
community (s), or pro-sociality for short. General ability (a) comprises all cognitive (IQ) and non-
cognitive skills (ambition, tenacity, work ethos) that make individuals productive in all occupations.
We assume that, if hired as a CHA, an individual will produce community health according toH(a),
which is increasing in a. The individual will draw utility sH(a), where pro-sociality (s ∈ [0, 1]) is
the weight that the individual puts on community health. We assume that ability and pro-sociality
are independently distributed in the population.
If hired, an individual with traits (ai, si) receives utility:
U(siH(ai),M)
To apply, an individual needs to pay cost c and whether he is hired depends on how his ability
compares to the other applicants’. Modelling the formation of expectations is beyond our scope
here; we simply assume that individuals see the link between their probability of success and their
own ability p(a) with p′ > 0, p′′ < 0. Thus individual i will apply if the expected utility as a CHA
net of application costs exceeds the utility in their next best alternative occupation, which, in this
setting, is mostly self-employment in agriculture or small trade where the agent is the residual
claimant. We denote this by V (a) and assume, as is standard, that the marginal return to ability
is higher in the private sector Va > Ua > 0 for every a. This is the empirically relevant case
because, as is common in the public sector, CHAs’ earnings are not linked to performance, while
self-employed agents in the private sector are the residual claimants on the value they create. Thus,
individual i applies if and only if E(a, s) = p(a)U(a, s) − c > V (a). To capture the fact that in
practice there are minimum qualification requirements, we assume that application costs are high
enough that E(0) < V (0), so that low ability individuals who have little chance of being hired do
not apply. Formally, there is a threshold of ability a such that all i with ai < a do not apply. The
Appendix shows that the structure of the solution depends on whether E(a) > V (a) for all ai > a.
If so, everybody with ai > a will apply. If not, there is a further threshold defined by E(a) = V (a¯)
and such that only i with with a < ai < a apply.
Our goal is to make precise the conditions under which treatment creates a trade-off by attract-
ing applicants with lower pro-sociality and higher ability. Treatment increases U through several
channels. Of these, the increase in the net present value of exogenous material benefits M is the
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one that makes the job relatively more attractive to individuals with low pro-sociality.14 Treatment
increases M through seniority based promotions and automatic salary progression. Individuals on
the Ministry career ladder are on civil service payroll and are entitled to all increases negotiated col-
lectively for government employees. Importantly for our purposes, all these increases are negotiated
centrally and are independent of the ability or performance of the specific individual.
To create a tradeoff, the increase in M must also attract higher ability applicants. This can
only happen if there is a threshold of ability a(si,M) such that individuals with ai > a(si,M)
do not apply. If so, the threshold will increase with M . A change in M that increases the upper
threshold a will increase the number of high ability applicants, thereby changing the probability of
being selected p(ai,M) for all i. In particular, ∂p∂a∂M > 0, that is when M is higher people expect
more high ability applicants. Thus the probability of being selected is more sensitive to a. Other
things equal, this implies that:
Result 1: Increasing material benefits M will attract higher ability applicants who would not
apply otherwise ( ∂a∂M > 0) and either (i) lower the ability of the lowest ranked applicant (
∂a
∂M < 0)
and increase the total number of applicants or (ii) discourage low ability applicants ( ∂a∂M > 0) and
have an ambiguous impact on the total number.
To assess the effect on pro-sociality we note that U is increasing in both a and s. The threshold
a(si) is increasing in s because, due to the fact that Va > Ua > 0, higher ability individuals need
to have a high level of pro-sociality to meet their participation constraint.15 Symmetrically, the
threshold a(si) is decreasing in s because more prosocial applicants have a higher expected payoff
for the same probability of being chosen, thus the probability and hence the level of ability that
make them indifferent between applying and not is lower. This implies that talent and pro-sociality
are positively (negatively) correlated among the highest (lowest) ability applicants, even though
they are not correlated in the population. Therefore we have:
Result 2: Under any M, the most able applicant is also the most prosocial. An increase in
M leaves the prosociality of the marginal applicant unchanged and has an ambiguous effect on the
prosociality of the average applicant.
Figure 2 illustrates treatment effects on ability and prosociality. To improve the legibility of the
figure we abstract from application costs and set c = 0 , p = 1. H = w + bHa and V = bPa. This
implies a = 0. Figure 2B illustrates the application frontier, that is all the combinations of a and
s such that an individual is indifferent between applying and not. This is drawn for H = w + bHa
and V = bPa. The frontier is positively sloped, so that the ability threshold is higher for more
prosocial applicants and all individuals below the frontier apply. Figure 2C shows that an increase
14Treatment can affect U in several ways that do not create tradeoffs, for instance by increasing the marginal
product of ability. This is due to career benefits giving high ability individuals the chance to be promoted to higher
ranked positions where they can benefit more people or have more influence on key decisions. This appeals to high a
individuals who can benefit from it and high s individuals who care about it. Thus treatment improves the quality
of the applicant pool in all dimensions without creating a trade-off.
15Formally Usds+ Uada = Vada, hence ds/da = Va−UaUs > 0
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inM shifts the frontier upward and makes it steeper.16 The effect on average pro-sociality depends
on the balance of two forces. First, the average pro-sociality of individuals whose a is low enough
that they apply without career benefits, is lower when these are offered. This is because U is
increasing in M ; thus for any a the level of s that makes individuals indifferent between applying
or not falls. This is the standard substitution or crowding out effect whereby material benefits and
pro-sociality are substitute sources of motivation. Note that this effect would be stronger if there
were application costs. Second, the average pro-sociality of individuals whose a is high enough that
they apply only with career benefits is higher than the average pro-sociality of those who apply
without.
Given that the effect on the infra-marginal and marginal applicants differ, the treatment effect
on hired CHAs depends on the selection mechanism. Mechanisms that pick the highest ability
candidates from the applicant pool will produce the largest possible positive difference in ability
and no difference in pro-sociality because the most able applicants within each pool are also the most
pro-social. Mechanisms that pick randomly from the pool will still produce a positive difference
in ability and a negative difference in pro-sociality if the average applicant under career incentives
is less pro-social. To understand how differences in the applicant pool translate into differences
among hired CHAs we need to understand the selection mechanism. This is the aim of the next
section.
4 Treatment effect on the applicant pool and selected candidates.
4.1 Treatment effect on the applicant pool
The recruitment drive yielded 2,457 applications, an average of 7.3 applicants for each position.
Overall, 1,804 (73.4%) applicants met the eligibility requirements and were invited for interviews;17
of these 1,585 (87.9%), or 4.5 per position, reported on their interview day when we administered
a questionnaire to collect information on skills, career ambition and prosociality. These 1,585 form
the applicant pool we analyze in this section.
To measure treatment effects on sorting and the composition of the applicant pool we collect
measures of ability and pro-sociality at the application stage for the universe of applicants who
were interviewed. To measure cognitive skills we use grade 12 scores in the final exam and the
number of courses taken in biology and other natural sciences. These are the skills measures used
as application requirements. For non-cognitive skills we focus on career ambition, measured by
asking applicants the job they envisage doing in 5 years time, and code as career motivated those
who aim to a higher ranked position in the Ministry. To measure pro-sociality we combine the
applicant’s self reported willingness to stay in the community in the long term together with the
16The frontier is the locus of combinations of (a, s) that satisfy U(s, a,M) = V (a). Therefore da
dM
= M
Va−Ua , which
is positive and increasing in s if Uas > 0.
17All completed application forms were taken to the district Ministry of Health office where district health officials
checked that requirements were met. No discretion was given at this stage; applicants who did not meet the objective
criteria were rejected, and those who did were invited for interviews.
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“Inclusion of Others in Self (IOS)” scale that measures alignment of interests (Aron et al. 2004).18
We do so to identify those who want to stay in the community because they care about community
outcomes, as opposed to those who stay for other reasons.
Guided by the framework, we estimate the effect of treatment on skills and pro-sociality, both
on the average applicant and as a function of skill rank. Table 1 shows that treatment attracts
individuals with higher cognitive skills and career motivation. The average effects are about 1/5 of
a standard deviation in the control group and all precisely estimated at the 5% confidence level or
above. Average prosociality is lower, albeit not precisely estimated, whilst age, gender and current
occupation are very similar. The latter is due to the fact that, in line with the evidence from the
Census in Table A.1, there is hardly any variation. Most applicants (70% of them) are farmers, a
further 9% are housewives, 6% are traders, and 5% teachers. Finally, the number of applicants per
health post is the same. Result 1 makes precise that this can happen if treatment increases both
ability thresholds. To test this, Figure 3, Panels A and B report the kernel density estimate as
well as the quantile treatment effects on total test scores. Both reveal a rightward shift, namely:
all applicants in treatment, from the lowest to the highest ranked, have higher test scores. Panels
C and D plot the treatment effect as a function of the applicant’s ability rank in the health post.
These are estimated in a regression that controls for the stratification variables and with standard
errors clustered at the district level. The graphs also report robust (not clustered) standard errors
for comparison. Rank is based on final exam scores, within community. In line with Panels A and
B, Panel C shows that test scores are higher at every rank. Most importantly, in line with the
theoretical framework, the difference in pro-sociality is zero for top ranked applicants and negative
for lower ranked applicants.
The results in Figure 3 are in line with the simple theoretical framework: ability increases
throughout whereas the effect on pro-sociality is zero for top ranked candidates and negative for
lower ranked candidates. The figure makes clear that the effect of treatment on CHAs themselves
will depend on how these are chosen among the applicants. We analyze this next.
4.2 The selection mechanism and treatment effect on selected candidates
Selection panels are in charge of choosing the two candidates that will serve as CHAs in the
health post. Panels have five members: the district health official, a representative from the health
post’s associated health center, and three members of the local neighborhood health committee.
Each panel was asked to nominate two top candidates and up to three reserves.The Government
explicitly stated a preference for women and for those who had previously worked as community
18IOS measures the extent to which individuals perceive community and self-interest as overlapping. Applicants
are asked to choose between four pictures, each showing two circles (labeled “self” and “community”) with varying
degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely overlapping. This variable equals 1 if the respondent
chooses the almost completely overlapping picture, 0 otherwise. IOS has been validated across a wide variety of
contexts, and adapted versions are found to be strongly correlated with environmental behavior (Schultz 2002) and
connectedness to the community (Mashek et al. 2007).
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health workers, but the ultimate choice was left to the panels. Overall, selection panels nominated
334 applicants as “top 2” candidates and 413 as reserves.19
To understand how differences in the applicant pool translate into differences in hired CHAs we
analyze how panels select candidates. This analysis also sheds light on whether treatment affects
panels’ choices and on which traits panel members deem important for the job. Table 2 estimates
the probability that candidate i in health post h is chosen as follows:
sih =
∑
j∈J
αcjChX
j
i +
∑
j∈J
αsj(1− Ch)Xji +
∑
j∈J
βjX¯
j
h + γNh + ζih
where sih = 1 if i is one of the two nominated candidates and 0 otherwise. Ch equals 1 if health
post h is in treatment and 0 if it is in the control group. Xji are indicator variables that equal 1
if candidate i is in the top three of trait j, and the core set J includes skills, ambition, and pro-
sociality. We also report regressions with an expanded set that includes social connections to local
political leaders to test whether connections help with getting the job when material benefits are
higher. To control for the strength of competition, we include the number of interviewed candidates
in the same health post Nh. We control for the stratification variables and cluster standard errors
at the district level. All results are robust to correcting for degrees of freedom using the procedure
in Young 2016.
The coefficients of interest are αcj and αsj , which measure the weight given to trait j in the
treatment and control groups, respectively. We test the null that panels use the same criteria
in both groups, that is αcj = αsj . Panels are exposed to treatment as they see the posters, but
in contrast to candidates, for whom the poster is the only source of information, panel members
know the job attributes and who would be suitable for it. The two more senior panel members—the
district health official and the health center representative—are employees of the Ministry of Health,
and hence are familiar with career progression rules regardless of treatment. Thus this is likely not
as powerful, or perhaps entirely moot.20 Table 2 reports the estimates of αcj and αsj for all j ∈ J
and the p-value of the test of equality.
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that panels put a strong positive weight on skills and pro-sociality
and do so equally in both treatment and control groups. The average probability that an applicant
who does not rank at the top of the skills and pro-sociality distributions and who has no career
ambition is .09. This increases by 12pp for applicants at the top of the skill distribution, by 7pp to
10pp for applicants with career ambitions. and by 6pp to 9pp for applicants with high pro-sociality.
The tests of equality between treatment and control do not reject the null for any of these traits.
Column 3 additionally shows that connections either to political leaders or to staff at the health
facility do not affect the probability of selection in either treatment or control.
19The nominations were reviewed centrally by the Government of Zambia, and 334 final candidates were invited
to join a yearlong medical training. Of these, 314 applicants accepted the invitation and, in June 2011, moved to the
training school in Ndola, Zambia’s second-largest city. Of the applicants who joined the program, 307 graduated and
started working in August 2012. All the health workers were deployed back to their communities of origin.
20Further analysis, available upon request, shows that treatment does not affect panel composition.
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Taken together, the evidence suggests that career opportunities attract applicants who have
different skills, career motivation, and pro-sociality and that all panels deem these traits to be
valuable and are more likely to choose applicants who rank highly in all three.
Our conceptual framework makes clear that, compared to a random selection mechanism, this
type of selection leads to higher skill differences and eliminates pro-sociality differences. To illus-
trate, we compare the traits of the CHAs selected by panels to 1000 random draws of two CHAs
from each health post’s applicant pool. Table 3 reports the average trait for panel selected CHAs
and the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the same traits when candidates are chosen randomly.
The table shows that the distribution of skills and motivation in treatment is to the right of control,
and that panels choose from the top in both groups. This implies that, compared to random selec-
tion, panels select CHAs who have higher exam scores and career motivation. Indeed, panel selected
CHAs score higher than the 90th percentile of randomly selected CHAs on all three measures. De-
spite the fact that panels put the same weight on talent and career motivation in treatment and
control, the average skill and career motivation of selected CHAs is higher in the treatment group
because treatment attracts candidates who do not apply in control.
In contrast, whereas randomly selected CHAs have lower pro-sociality in the treatment group,
panel selection undoes this difference because, as shown in Figure 3, the most talented applicants
in each pool have the same level of pro-sociality, and panels select these. The fact that treatment
creates a tradeoff between ability and pro-sociality for low ability applicants is of no consequence
because these are not hired. It is important to note that this requires no knowledge of the applicants’
pro-sociality and does not rely on the expertise of the panel. Indeed, any mechanism that selects
the most talented, including an automatic rule on test scores, would neutralize the trade-off.
5 Inputs in Service Delivery
5.1 Measuring Inputs in Service Delivery
The health workers’ main task, to which they are required to devote 80% of their time, or 4 out of
5 days per week, is to visit households. The input part of our analysis focuses on the number of
visits completed over the course of 18 months, from August 2012 (when the health workers started
work) until January 2014. The number of household visits is akin to an attendance measure for
teachers or nurses: the health workers are supposed to work in people’s houses, and we measure
how often they are there. Naturally, differences in the number of visits can be compensated for
with differences in other inputs; we discuss this possibility in Section 5.3 after establishing the main
results. And differences in inputs ultimately are of interest only if they lead to better outcomes,
which we will discuss in Section 6.
Our primary measure of household visits is built by aggregating information on each visit from
individual receipts. All the health workers are required to carry receipt books and issue each
household a receipt for each visit, which the households are asked to sign. The health workers
are required to keep the book with the copies of the receipts to send to the Government when
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completed. They are also required to send all information on these receipts—consisting of the
date, time, and duration of the visit, as well as the client’s phone number—via text message to the
Ministry of Health. These text messages are collected in a central data-processing facility, which
we manage.
Since visits are measured by aggregating text messages sent by the health workers themselves,
identification can be compromised by the presence of measurement error that is correlated with
treatment. For instance, health workers in the career treatment might put more effort in reporting
visits via text messages or might report visits that never took place, leading to a positive bias in
the estimated treatment effect.
We validate our visits measure by comparing it to administrative data and households’ own
reports of health worker activity. The administrative data is drawn from the Health Management
and Information System (HMIS), which is the Ministry of Health’s system for collecting routine
health services data at government facilities. These are reported at the end of each month and
sent electronically to the Ministry via a mobile platform, jointly by the two health workers and
the other staff working in each health post. As HMIS data are only available aggregated at the
health post level (summed over the two workers in each health post) we regress these on our visit
measure, also aggregated at the health post level. Columns 1 and 2 in Table A.3 show that the two
measures are strongly correlated (r=.767) and that the correlation is the same in treatment and
control, which contradicts the differential reporting hypothesis.
The households’ reports are collected via a survey that we administered to 16 randomly chosen
households in each of 47 randomly selected communities chosen from the set of communities where
the health workers operate, stratified by district. We ask respondents whether they know each of
the health workers (97% do), whether they have ever been visited (43% of them have), and their
level of satisfaction with each health worker. Columns 3-6 show a precisely estimated correlation
between our visit measure and the probability that a household reports a visit, as well as their level
of satisfaction with the health worker’s performance. There is no significant difference between the
treatment and control groups, casting doubt on the relevance of differential reporting.
Taken together, the findings in Table A.3 validate our visits measure. Ultimately, however, we
will not be able to detect a treatment effect on households’ health outcomes in Section 6 if measured
differences in visits capture differences in reporting rather than in actual visits.
5.2 Treatment Effect on Household Visits
Table 4 reports the reduced form effects of treatment on performance, that is the estimates of:
vihdp = α+ βCid + Zhγ + δEd + ρp + ihdp (5.1)
where vihdp is the number of visits completed by health worker i in catchment area h, district d,
and province p. Cid equals 1 if agent i is recruited and operates in a district assigned to the career
opportunities treatment. Zh is a vector of area characteristics, which includes the number of staff
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at the health post, cell network coverage, and the distribution of households between farms and
villages described in Table A.1. We control for the stratification variables, district-level high school
graduation rate Ed, and province indicators ρp throughout. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of randomization, the district.
The coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of making career opportunities salient
at the recruitment stage on the number of visits completed over 18 months. Considering that all
the health workers are given the same information on career opportunities during the year-long
training, β captures the effect of career opportunities on performance through selection. Note
that selection can affect performance by increasing productivity for a given level of effort or by
increasing the marginal return to effort. An example of the former is talent for logistics: for the
same amount of effort, a more talented health worker plans better and reaches more households in
the same amount of time. An example of the latter is the utility weight put on career advancement:
health workers who value career more draw a higher marginal benefit from a given unit of effort
and therefore exert more effort.
The causal effect of career opportunities on performance can be identified under the assumptions
that (i) Cid is orthogonal to ihdp, and (ii) there are no spillovers between the two groups. Orthog-
onality is obtained via random assignment. Spillovers via movements of health workers between
treatment and control areas are ruled out by the program requirement that health workers must
have been residing in the community they want to work in prior to applying. This implies that
career opportunities cannot draw in talent from control areas. Spillovers of information, caused for
example by potential applicants in control seeing the treatment poster, would introduce a down-
ward bias because they would reduce the information differences between treatment and control.
Information spillovers are minimized by design, as recruitment messages were randomized at the
district level—which, given the travel distance between rural communities in different districts,
makes it very unlikely that applicants in one group might have seen the poster assigned to the
other group. Importantly, information cannot accidentally spillover through the district officials
that implement the program or through the recruitment panels, as these are only exposed to one
treatment.
Column 1 of Table 4 reveals a large and precisely estimated effect of career opportunities
on household visits: health workers recruited by making career opportunities salient do 94 more
visits (29% more than control) over the course of 18 months. The median treatment effect is 104
(bootstrapped s.e. 43.1), which allays the concern that the average effect is driven by outliers. The
magnitude of the difference is economically meaningful: if each of the 147 health workers in control
had done as many visits as their counterparts in the career treatment, 13,818 more households
would have been visited over the 18 month period. Given that for most of these households, health
workers are the only providers of health services, the difference between treatments is likely to have
implications for health outputs in these communities. We return to this issue in Section 6.
Columns 2-4 divide the 18-month period into three and show that the estimated treatment
effect is identical in the three semesters. This casts doubt on the alternative hypothesis that agents
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in the two groups have the same traits, but agents in the treatment group perceive stronger career
incentives because they have known about them for longer (about 2 years vs 1 year for the control
group). Such a difference should wane with time, while the difference due to stable traits should
be stable.21
To shed light on what treatment health workers do differently, we administer a time use survey
to all health workers after they have started working. The findings, reported in detail in the
Appendix, indicate that treatment and control health workers work similar hours and allocate
their time similarly across similar activities. This indicates that treatment health workers are more
efficient at their jobs. Household visits take place in remote, low-density areas: the median 78
square km area has 200 households, with an interquartile range of 130 to 360. It is thus rather
time consuming to go from house to house, and this is compounded by the fact that roads are
bad. In this setting, the ability to plan—e.g., by making appointments with specific households
or collecting information as to whether members are likely to be home before setting out to visit
them—is an important determinant of completing visits successfully.
To conclude we establish the extent to which differences in performance are due to selection
on observables. We search for the vector of observables that explains the largest possible share
of variation of performance in the control group and use the estimated coefficients to predict
performance in the treatment group. This yields the predicted difference between treatment and
control on the basis of the observables that best predict performance. The best predictors explain
31% of the observed variation in control and the predicted difference between treatment and control
is 43 visits. Given that the actual, unconditional performance gap is 101, differences in observables
explain 43% of it. The remaining 57% is due to traits we do not measure.
The finding that observables have limited power in explaining performance differences echoes
the well established finding that differences in teachers’ effectiveness are large and only weakly
correlated with observable traits. It is also consistent with other settings where agents self-select,
such as in applying for welfare programs (Alatas et al. 2015) or purchasing health products (Ashraf
et al. 2010). In those settings, like in ours, self-selection cannot be mimicked by targeting on
observable traits.
5.3 Beyond Number of Visits: Compensation Mechanisms and Other Activities
Table 5 investigates the hypothesis that health workers in the control group take other actions
that compensate for the lower number of visits. Column 1 tests whether control health workers
are more likely to be retained while career health workers leave with their newly acquired skills as
soon as it is feasible to do so. Since the health workers are bonded to their position for one year,22
21The fact that the treatment effect is stable also rules out that it is driven by a negative “surprise” for agents
in the control group (i.e., their effort response to finding out about career opportunities is negative and larger—in
absolute value—than what it would have been had they known the career opportunities at the outset).
22The health workers were told that if they quit before one year of service, they would be required to pay monthly
wages for any months not worked (rather than simply relinquishing pay) to compensate the Government for the free
one-year training that they received.
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we measure retention by the number of health workers who make at least one visit after the one
year commitment has elapsed. We find that, by this measure, 18% of health workers drop out,
though some of this may be due to a combination of malfunctioning phones and the rainy season
(falling between months 15-18 in our analysis window), making travel to cell network-accessible
areas difficult. This attrition rate is balanced across treatments. It is important to note that
according to the Ministry’s rule, health workers have to wait two years before applying for higher-
ranked positions, such that none of those who left their positions did so for career progression. It
is possible that career opportunities will affect retention rates after the two-year mark. Whether
this entails a welfare cost depends on whether the workers can be easily replaced and whether the
Government can use their skills in other jobs. In our context, replacement is straightforward; the
number of applicants per post was above seven, and the government faces scarcity of health staff
at all levels, such that promoting high-performing health workers to nursing and other higher-level
cadres is likely to be welfare-improving.
The number of visits can hide heterogeneity on a variety of dimensions that can make the
health workers less effective in generating health outcomes, such as doing shorter visits, targeting
the head of household rather than women and children, or targeting easier-to-reach households.
We provide evidence that career health workers do not do worse on any of these dimensions. They
devote the same time to a single visit (column 2), and are equally likely to target their primary
clients—women and children (column 3). They also reach more households (column 4) and make
more follow-up visits (column 5). The point estimates indicate that just over one-third (36/94) of
the total treatment effect is due to career health workers visiting more households, and two-thirds
to them visiting the same household more than once. This is consistent with the two groups of
health workers having a similar number of households in their catchment area and visiting them
at least once, but treatment health workers doing more follow-up visits. Note that follow-ups are
considered an integral part of the health worker job, in view of which Ministry of Health guidelines
state health workers should attempt to visit each household on a quarterly basis. Finally, Table A.5
shows that treatment health workers allocate their time in a similar way to control health workers
during household visits. This allays the concern that health workers who see themselves as health
professionals neglect “soft” tasks like counseling.
Besides household visits, the health workers are expected to assist staff at the health post by
seeing patients, assisting with antenatal care, and maintaining the facility. They are also supposed
to organize community meetings such as health education talks at the health post and in schools.
Columns 6-7 investigate whether differences in household visits are compensated by differences in
secondary tasks using HMIS data on the number of community meetings health workers organize
and the number of patients they attend to at the health post. The latter should be seen as a proxy
of the quantity of services delivered by the health workers at the health post, as seeing patients
is mostly a nurse’s job. We find that health workers recruited by making career opportunities
salient organize twice as many meetings over 18 months (43 vs. 22), and the difference is precisely
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estimated. The effect of career opportunities on the number of patients the health workers see at
the health post is also positive, but small and not precisely estimated.
6 Facility Utilization, Health Practices, and Health Outcomes
The program leads to a substantial increase in the number of health staff operating in the commu-
nities where the health workers are deployed: the number of staff associated with the community
health post increases on average from 1.5 to 3.5. Given the size of the increase and the magnitude
of the treatment effect on household visits and community mobilization meetings, it is reasonable to
expect treatment to affect health outcomes in these communities. The health workers can directly
affect facility utilization and health practices by increasing both demand, e.g., by providing infor-
mation and promoting behavioral changes, and supply, e.g., by helping cover staff shortages at the
health post or delivering medical treatments to households. In turn, improved facility utilization
and practices should lead to better outcomes.
Besides their intrinsic importance for the welfare of these communities, treatment effects on
facility utilization and household outcomes allow us to shed light on whether health workers in
the control group perform better on dimensions we cannot observe enough to improve outcomes.
For instance, treatment health workers could target households that are more interested in health
services and would use facilities when necessary anyway, while control health workers could target
households that they need to persuade to change behavior, and that require more work, leading
to fewer visits overall. If this were true, treatment would be uncorrelated (or even negatively
correlated) with facility utilization and health outcomes.
To provide evidence on whether treatment affected facility utilization, we use data from the
Ministry’s HMIS administrative records; to measure effects on health practices and outcomes, we
survey households residing in the communities where the health workers operate. As the main
remit of the health worker job is mother and child health, we focus on this throughout.
6.1 Treatment Effect on Facility Utilization
The Ministry’s HMIS administrative records are compiled by facilities’ senior staff and transmitted
to the Ministry of Health via an electronic platform. Two levels of facilities serve these communities:
health centers and health posts.23 The health workers are supposed to encourage women to give
birth at the closest health center and to bring in children for regular visits and immunizations at
the closest facility (health center or health post). The importance of institutional deliveries in this
context cannot be understated: Zambia’s maternal mortality rates are very high and health centers
have the equipment and medical supplies that can prevent these deaths. Regular children’s visits
23Health facilities in Zambia are structured according to a population-based hierarchy. Health posts are the first-
level health facility for most rural communities and provide basic medical care (no inpatient or surgical services).
Health centers, which typically serve a population encompassing four to five health posts, provide both outpatient and
inpatient services, including labor and delivery and minor surgical procedures. District hospitals in turn encompass
several health center catchment areas and are primarily focused on inpatient care.
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ensure that conditions such as diarrhea are treated before they become dangerous. Immunizations
protect children from potentially fatal illnesses.
To test whether the treatment affected facility utilization, we obtain information on institutional
deliveries, children’s visits, and immunizations for the period January 2011-June 2014 and estimate
the following specification:
yhdpt = α+ βChd + γAt + δChd ∗At + Zhθ + Edφ+ ρp + ξhdpt
where yhdpt is the outcome in health facility h in district d and province p at quarter t.24
h represents the lowest level of government facility to which the health workers can refer their
patients. This is the health post if it is operational; if not, the closest health center. The only
exception is childbirths, which are always measured at the health center level, as that is where they
are supposed to take place. Chd=1 if facility h is located in a district randomly assigned to the
career treatment. We have data for 14 quarters, equally divided before and after the health workers’
arrival, and At=1 after the health workers’ arrival (4th quarter of 2012). To minimize composition
bias and to test for robustness to facility fixed effect models, we restrict the sample to the facilities
for which we have at least three observations before and after the health workers’ arrival.25 Zh is
a vector of area characteristics, which includes the number of staff at the health post, cell network
coverage, and the distribution of households between farms and villages described in Table A.1. We
control for the stratification variables, district-level high school graduation rate Ed, and provinces
indicators ρp throughout. Standard errors are clustered at the level of randomization, the district.
The parameter of interest is δ, the difference in differences between facilities in treatment and
control districts before and after the health workers’ arrival. Under the parallel trend assumption,
δ captures the effect of career opportunities for health workers on these outputs.
Table 6 shows that indeed, career opportunities improve clinic utilization outputs. In particular,
the number of women giving birth at a health center increases by 30% relative to the mean in
control areas at baseline. The effect on institutional deliveries is thus the same order of magnitude
as the effect of performance pay for clinics as evaluated in Rwanda (23% Basinga et al. 2011) and
Cambodia (25% Van de Poel et al. 2014). Selection and incentive effects of similar magnitudes
(22% each) are also found in the only firm study that identifies the two separately (Lazear 2000).
Table 6 also shows that the number of children under age five visited increases by 24%, the
number of children under 5 weighed increases by 22%, and the number of children under 12 months
of age receiving polio vaccination increases by 20%. The effects on postnatal visits for women, BCG,
and measles vaccinations are also positive and in the 8-22% magnitude range, but are not precisely
estimated. The average standardized treatment effect (Kling et al. 2007) over all outcomes is .277,
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Reassuringly, there are no significant differences
24HMIS data should be transmitted to MoH monthly, but in practice (due to poor connectivity), reports are
missing for some months and the information added to the following month. We aggregate the data at the quarterly
level to smooth out monthly fluctuations due to this.
25This restriction keeps 77% of the health posts and 70% of the health centers in the sample.
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between treatment and control in any of these outcomes before the health workers’ arrival: all the
estimated β coefficients are small and not significantly different from zero.
To provide support to our identifying assumption, in Table A.6 (Panel A) we run a placebo test
where we split the pre-health worker period in two halves and test whether outcomes improve in
treatment areas over time even in the absence of the health workers. Reassuringly, they do not.
Finally, Table A.6 (Panel B) estimates (2) with facility fixed effects; the fact that all estimated
δ coefficients remain stable provides evidence that they are not biased by time-invariant facility
unobservables correlated with treatment.
6.2 Treatment Effect on Health Practices and Outcomes
To provide evidence on the effect of treatment on health practices and outcomes, we survey house-
holds in 47 randomly chosen communities located in each of the 47 districts where the health
workers operate. We randomly choose 16 households in each community, surveying 738 in total.26
These surveys are administered by a team of enumerators who are trained by us and unconnected
to the health workers or the Ministry of Health. As the main focus of the health worker job is
mother and child health, we only survey households that contain at least one child under five. The
survey contains modules on health and sanitation knowledge, health practices, incidence of illnesses,
and anthropometrics for the youngest child. Knowledge, practices, and illnesses are self-reported;
deworming and immunization data are drawn from the child health card, and anthropometrics are
measured by trained enumerators. We interview the main carer of the child, which is their mother
in 90% of the cases and either a grandparent or a sibling in the remaining 10%. All questions are
drawn from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Zambia questionnaire, with the exception
of the health knowledge module, which we designed based on the health worker curriculum, and
mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC), which the DHS does not measure.
Table 7 reports the estimates of:
yidp = α+ βCid +Diγ + δEd + ρp + idp (6.1)
where yidp is the outcome of child (or respondent) i in district d and province p. Cid equals 1 if
child (or respondent) i lives in a district that is assigned to the career opportunities treatment. Di
is a vector of child, respondent, and household characteristics that includes child age and gender,
household size and number of assets, and the education level of the respondent. As above, we
control for the stratification variables, district-level high school graduation rate Ed and provinces
indicators ρp throughout, and cluster standard errors at the district level.
26The sample frame had 752 households but we interviewed 738. The missing households are evenly spread across
communities as the number of households surveyed in a community varies between 13 and 16. The difference is due
to several factors. In some communities, safety concerns related to local political tensions forced the survey team to
leave the community before completing surveying. In other communities, especially low-density communities where
travel times between households could exceed one hour, the survey team was unable to find a sufficient number of
eligible households within the allotted survey time. One household interview was lost due to malfunction of the
mobile device on which the interview was recorded.
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Column 1 shows that the average respondent answers 74% of the knowledge questions correctly
and that this does not differ by treatment status. In contrast, treatment affects all the health
practices we collect information on. In particular, Columns 2 and 3 show that children under 2
living in treatment areas are 5pp more likely to be breastfed,27 and their stools are 12pp more
likely to be safely disposed; these effects represent an 8% and 20% increase from the control group
mean, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show that treatment also increases the incidence of deworming
treatments by 16% and the likelihood that the child is on track with the immunization schedule by
4.7 percentage points, which is 81% of the control group mean (5.8%).28 Importantly, the treatment
affects the incidence of immunizations for children who are young enough to have been exposed to
the health workers when their immunization period started (as shown in Column 5), but not for
those who were too old to start the cycle when the health workers started working (coefficient -.014,
standard error .022). This echoes the findings in Table 6 that show no difference in immunization
rates between treatment and control areas before the health workers started working.
Columns 6-8 measure treatment effects on the incidence of three main illness symptoms: fever,
diarrhea, and cough. These are fairly common, as 47%, 26%, and 45% of children in control
areas had experienced them in the past two weeks. As it is widely acknowledged, self-reported
symptoms can actually worsen as knowledge improves and individuals learn how to recognize them,
so these effects are lower bounds. We find that treatment reduces the incidence of cough symptoms
by 7pp while leaving the others unchanged. Finally, Columns 9-12 show treatment effects on
anthropometric measurements. We report weight-for-age z-scores and mid-upper arm circumference
(MUAC). The combination of these two allows us to measure both chronic and acute malnutrition.29
Following WHO’s guidelines, we use the -2SD and -3SD thresholds for weight-for-age z-scores to
measure moderate and severe underweight, respectively, and 12.5 cm and 11.5 cm for MUAC
to measure moderate and severe wasting, respectively (Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance
Project 2011). According to these measures, 21% of the children in control areas are underweight,
and 5% severely so. The incidence of wasting is much lower, with 3.6% of the children exhibiting
some wasting and 1.4% severe wasting. These data, which match the corresponding DHS figures
for rural Zambia (Government of Zambia 2014), suggest that these areas are characterized by high
rates of chronic malnutrition but low rates of acute malnutrition.
The findings in columns 9-10 show that children in treatment areas are 5pp less likely to be
underweight (25% of the control group mean) and 3pp less likely to be severely underweight (55%
27WHO recommends breastfeeding until the age of two years.
28A child is defined to be on track if she has completed all immunizations required for her age. At age 3 months, this
includes BCG, OPV 0-2, PCV 1-2, DPT-HepB-Hib 1-2, and rotavirus 1-2. At 4 months, this includes, additionally,
OPV 3, PCV 3, and DPT-HepB-Hib 3. At 9 months, this includes OPV 4 if OPV 0 was not given, and measles 1.
The immunization series is complete at age 18 months with measles 2. Finally, we consider a child to be on track for
vitamin A supplementation if she has ever been supplemented.
29We did not measure weight-for-height, an alternative to MUAC for assessing acute malnutrition, for three reasons.
First, compared to weight and MUAC, height measurement is more invasive, requiring, for children under two, laying
the child down on a height board and having two enumerators hold the child while collecting the measurement.
During survey piloting, many respondents (and the children themselves) balked at this procedure. Second, accurate
height measurement is made difficult by high measurement error relative to standard effect sizes (Mwangome et al.
2012). Finally, MUAC is a more accurate predictor of mortality (Myatt et al. 2006).
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of the control group mean). In line with this, columns 11 and 12 show a large percentage reduction
in wasting, but given the limited occurrence of this in our sample, the effects are not precisely
estimated. The average standardized effect of the two measures is precisely estimated with p-value
0.039 for the less severe measures and 0.0232 for the more severe.
The average standardized treatment effect across all variables (coded so that higher values
correspond to better outcomes) is .108, significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Taken together, the findings in this and the previous section show that differences in the inputs
provided by treatment and control health workers are matched by differences in facility utilization
and household health practices. The selection effect of career opportunities is strong enough to
generate discernible differences in household behaviors and child health outcomes.
7 Conclusion
Attracting effective employees is a core objective for all organizations. This can be a particularly
challenging objective to achieve for public organizations because both effective performance (in, for
example, generating health impact) and desirable employee attributes are difficult to measure. But
the stakes to getting this right are high. Our paper has shown that offering a civil service position
with career opportunities for community-based work attracts agents who deliver health services
with substantial impact. This significant effect on the health and well-being of communities is
driven entirely by a selection effect of the types of agents drawn into the position.
The civil service job we study is one sometimes referred to as a “street-level bureaucrat,” a job
where internalizing the utility of beneficiaries could be particularly helpful. Yet it was in just such
a job that offering a career in the civil service, in posters that clearly attracted ambitious types,
provided large impacts. Of course, the career opportunities which attracted ambitious types—a
career in the Ministry of Health—entail some social benefit, and the community-oriented nature
of the job attracted a basic level of altruism across the board. But it is in precisely these types
of jobs where it has been argued that adding individualistic benefits, such as material or career
opportunities, might attract the “wrong” type of individual. Our experiment reveals that this is
indeed the case, as the lower ability applicants in the treatment group have lower prosociality. Thus
if candidates were picked by a random draw we would expect fewer pro-social recruited candidates
in treatment.
In practice, however, selection mechanisms, in Zambia and elsewhere, do not choose applicants
randomly. To the extent that the mechanism picks from the top of the ability distribution, the
sorting equilibrium guarantees that these are the most pro-social. This is where our findings have
implications for policy strategies such as maintaining the volunteer status of community-based
work, or low salaries and lack of career opportunities in teaching and health professions (World
Health Organization 2006; Lehmann and Sanders 2007). The findings also stress the importance
of giving the right incentives to selectors or, if unfeasible, to use cutoff rules on skill requirements.
The two components of recruitment—sorting and selection—are equally important because good
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candidates cannot be hired if they do not apply and improving the applicant pool is useless unless
the best candidates are selected.
The findings measure the productivity gains that come from effective selection via recruitment:
treatment health workers provide more inputs at the same cost, since wages are the same across
both treatments.30 The fact that the health workers are recruited locally from the communities
where they are meant to serve implies that there is no competition for talent across communities:
career opportunities can thus be offered in each community without losing effectiveness, as each
community can only hire from their own pool, and most communities in these areas have access to
a pool of skilled individuals who are either unemployed or in low skills jobs.
While retention rates after 18 months are the same in the two groups, agents in the career
incentives treatment might leave their posts for higher-ranked positions sooner than those in the
control group. Whether this entails a welfare cost depends on whether they can be easily replaced
and whether the government can use their skills in other jobs. In our context, replacement is
straightforward; the number of applicants per post was above seven, and the government faces
scarcity of health staff at all levels, such that promoting strong performers to nursing and other
higher-level cadres is likely to be welfare-improving. In contexts where retention in the original
post is more important, the welfare cost of attracting agents who expect to move on will be higher.
The benefits of attracting ambitious and talented individuals to service delivery in remote areas
go beyond the positive effect on the provision of public services. Before the program, 80% of
the health workers, whose education credentials were sufficient to apply for nursing school, were
engaged in subsistence farming or housework. By providing jobs with a career path, idle human
capital was put to good use. Of course, we cannot quantify the opportunity cost of the health
workers’ time, namely the value of the activities they give up to become full time health workers,
and the size of this difference between treatment and control. If productivity in these alternative
occupations is increasing in the same qualities that make a health worker productive, the findings
imply that the opportunity cost is higher in the treatment group; that is, the treatment draws
in more productive farmers or houseworkers. By revealed preference, we know that the private
value of the health worker job must be at least equal to the private value of these activities.
Otherwise these individuals would have not switched occupations. To the extent that the social
value produced by career health workers in their new jobs exceeds the loss in social value from
agriculture and housework, this is a net positive effect for society.
A career-oriented position for community-based public services delivery allows the Weberian
vision of the modern state to meet two goals which fuel each other: economic development, in the
30Due to political constraints, all agents had to be paid the same amount. This implies that we cannot judge
whether agents attracted by career opportunities have a higher reservation wage, such that their higher performance
comes at a price; in other words, the government could get the agents in the control group to work for a lower
wage. A priori, the difference in reservation wages between applicants in the two treatments is difficult to sign: that
applicants to the career opportunities treatment are more skilled suggests that it might be positive, whereas the fact
that they expect to move on to better-paid positions suggests that it might be negative (for example, interns are
typically willing to forego compensation for the sake of career opportunities).
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form of skilled jobs which attract and train talent nationwide, and the effective provision of public
services.
26
Figure 1: Treatment and control posters
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 MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
 
 
 
 
 
ONE-YEAR COURSE IN COMMUNITY HEALTH 
 
The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Zambia is launching a new national Community Health Worker (CHW) strategy and invites 
applicants to participate in the inaugural training of community health workers. 
 
The training will begin on 30th August 2010 and will be held at the Provincial level for selected applicants. All participation costs, 
including transportation, meals and accommodation will be covered by the Ministry of Health.  
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health care system 
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o Clinical Officer 
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• Endorsed by Neighborhood Health Committee 
within place of residence 
• Preference will be given to women and those 
with previous experience as a CHW 
 
APPLICATION METHOD: 
 
Submit to the DESIGNATED HEALTH CENTRE 
indicated above: 
• Completed application form with necessary 
endorsements. If no blank forms are attached to 
this notice, kindly obtain a blank one at the 
nearest health centre. 
• Photocopy of school certificate documenting 
completion of Grade 12 and two “O” levels. 
• Photocopy of Zambian national registration 
card. 
 
For more information: Contact the designated 
health centre indicated above.  
 
CLOSING DATE: 30th JULY 2010. 
Only shortlisted candidates will be contacted for interview. 
TRAINING OPPORTUNITY 
   DESIGNATED HEALTH CENTRE:    FOR POSTING AT: 
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Figure 2: Treatment effects on the applicant pool, in theory
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Figure 3: Treatment effects on the applicant pool
Notes: Panel A reports kernel density estimates of exam scores in treatment and control. Panel B reports quantile treatment effects estimates on exam scores and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. Panels C and D 
report the treatment effect on talent and prosociality as a function of the applicant's skill rank in her health post; the dashed (dotted) lines are 95% CI based on standard errors clustered at the health post (district) level. 
The treatment effect is estimated as the interaction of treatmentXrank conditional on stratification variables. “Applicants” are the 1585 candidates who were interviewed for the position. Treatment=1 if the health worker is 
recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Ordinary levels or O-levels are administered by the Examinations Council of Zambia (ECZ) to 12th-grade students, the highest grade in the Zambian 
secondary education system. O-levels total exam score is constructed as the sum of inverted O-levels scores (1=9, 2=8, and so on) from all subjects in which the applicant wrote the exam, so that larger values correspond 
to better performance. O-levels passed in  biology and other natural sciences equals the number of O-levels passed in biology, chemistry, physics, science, and agricultural science. Prosociality is the average of "Do you 
see yourself in the community in 5-10 years" (yes/no) and the Inclusion of Others in Self scale (Aron, A. et al., "Including Others in the Self," European Review of Social Psychology, 2004, 15, 101-132). Applicants are 
asked to choose between sets of pictures, each showing two circles (labeled "self" and "community") with varying degrees of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely overlapping. 
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Table A.1: Eligible population by treatment (randomization balance)
treatment control
 p-value of the 
difference 
A. Characteristics of the eligible population
Share of eligibles in the district (18-45 year olds with grade 12 or above) .044 .043
(.205) (.203)
Share of women among the eligibles .371 .391
(.483) (.488)
Main activity of eligible candidates during the past 12 months:
not working .279 .296
(.456) (.448)
unpaid work .201 .229
(.400) (.420)
paid work .457 .437
(.498) (.496)
of which: mid skill .240 .230
(.427) (.421)
of which: low skill .483 .453
(.499) (.498)
B. Catchment area characteristics
Number of staff in health post* 1.49 1.36
(1.09) (1.17)
Geographical distribution of households in catchment area:*
Most people live in their farms, none in villages .082 .091
(.276) (.289)
Some people live in farms, some in small villages (5-10hh) .529 .532
(.502) (.502)
Most people live in medium/large villages (more than 10hh), a few on their farms .388 .364
(.490) (.484)
Poor cell network coverage* .082 .065
(.277) (.248)
C. Target population characteristics
District population density (persons/km2) 13.58 14.08 .854
(8.88) (9.92)
Share of district population under 5 .187 .187 .915
(.390) (.390)
Main type of toilet: Pit latrine or better** .718 .667 .494
(.449) (.471)
Household water supply: Protected borehole or better** .361 .416 .248
(.480) (.492)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 3 reports the p-value of the test of equality of means based on standard errors 
clustered at the district level. Treatment=1 if the health worker is recruited in a district where career opportunities were made salient. Variables are drawn from the 2010 
Census (10% PUMS sample) except those indicated by *, which are drawn from our surveys, and those indicated by **, which are drawn from the 2010 Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS), which covers 20,000 HHs and is representative at the district level. Activities codes follow the ILO ISCO88 convention. Mid-
skill includes ISCO codes between 300 and 599, namely technicians, clerical workers and services and sales workers. Low-skill includes ISO codes below 600, namely 
agriculture, crafts, basic manufacturing and elementary occupations. Number of staff in health post is the total number of nurses, environmental health technicians, and 
clinical officers assigned to the health post as reported by district officials surveyed by phone. Information on the geographical distribution of HHs was obtained from a 
survey of the deployed CHAs before deployment. CHAs were shown stylized maps accompanied by a description and asked to choose the one that most closely 
resembled the catchment area of their health post. Questions were asked to each CHA individually so that two CHAs from the same health post could give different 
answers. For the 5 out of 161 cases in which the two CHAs gave different answers, we use the information provided by supervisors to break the tie. To measure cell 
network coverage we attempt to call all CHAs after deployment. We make daily calls for 118 consecutive days. The health post is classified as having poor coverage if we 
do not manage to reach either of its two CHAs during this period. Main type of toilet: Pit latrine or better equals 1 if the surveyed household uses a pit latrine, ventilated 
improved pit (VIP), or flush toilet, and 0 if bucket, other, or no toilet. Household water supply: Protected borehole or better equals 1 if the water supply comes from a 
protected borehole or well, communal tap, or other piped water system, and 0 if it comes from an unprotected well or borehole, river/dam/stream, rain water tank, or other.
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WEB APPENDIX (For Online Publication only)
A Randomization Balance
Table A.1 describes three sets of variables that can affect the supply of health workers, the demand
for their services, and their working conditions. For each variable, the table reports the means and
standard deviations in treatment and control, as well as the p-value of the test of means equality,
with standard errors clustered at the level of randomization, the district. Table A.1 shows that the
randomization yielded a balanced sample, as all p-values of the test of equality are greater than
.05. As treatment and control means are very close throughout, we comment on treatment group
values in the rest of this section.
Panel A reports statistics on the eligible population drawn from the 2010 Census. This shows
that the eligibles—namely, 18-45 year-old Zambian citizens with at least grade 12 education—account
for 4.4% of the district population, and that among them, 37% are female. The majority (54%)
were either out of work or in unpaid employment over the past twelve months.31 Among the 46%
engaged in income generating activities (either as employees or self-employed), fewer than one third
are employed in high skill occupations (such as teachers, which account for 9% of the eligible popu-
lation), and about half are employed in low skill occupations, mostly in agriculture which accounts
for 18% of the eligible population. Taken together, the evidence suggests that, despite their edu-
cational achievements, the majority of the eligible population is either out of work or employed in
occupations below their skill level.
Panel B illustrates the characteristics of the catchment areas. These variables are drawn from
surveys administered to district officials and the health workers themselves. Three points are of
note. First, health posts are poorly staffed in both the treatment and control groups; the average
number of staff (not including the new health workers) is 1.5. Given that the aim is to assign two
health workers to each health post, the program more than doubles the number of health staff in
these communities. Second, the areas vary in the extent to which households live on their farms
or in villages, but the frequency of either type is similar in the treatment and control groups. This
is relevant as travel times between households depend on population density and are higher when
households are scattered over a large area, as opposed to being concentrated in a village. Third,
over 90% of the catchment areas in both groups have at least some cell network coverage, which is
relevant for our analysis, as some performance measures are collected via SMS messages.
Panel C illustrates the characteristics of the target population that are relevant for the demand
for health worker services. First, population density is fairly low in both groups, which implies that
the health workers have to travel long distances between households. This also implies that the
ability to plan and efficiently implement visits is likely to play a key role in determining the number
of households reached. Second, children under 5, who (together with pregnant women) are the main
targets of the health workers, account for 19% of the population. Third, Panel C shows that access
31The 28% who were out of work are either unemployed (13%), housewives (7.5%), or full time students (8.5%).
Most (65%) of the unpaid jobs are in agriculture. These are balanced across treatments.
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to latrines and—most noticeably—protected water supply is limited in these areas. Lack of latrines
and protected water supply favor the spread of waterborne infections, to which pregnant women
and children are particularly vulnerable, and, through this, affects the demand for health workers’
services.
B Model
If hired, an individual with traits (ai, si) receives utility:
U(siH(ai),M)
To apply, an individual needs to pay cost c and whether he is hired depends on how his ability
compares to the other applicants’. We define the probability p(a,M) to be increasing and concave in
a, pa > 0, paa < 0. Moreover we assume that paM > 0, namely higher M makes the probability more
sensitive to a. Denote the outside option by V (a) and assume, as is standard, that the marginal
return to ability is higher in the private sector Va > Ua > 0 for every a. Thus, individual i applies
if and only if E(a, s) = p(a)U(a, s)− c > V (a). We assume that application costs are high enough
that E(0) < V (0), so that low ability individuals who have little chance of being hired do not apply.
B.1 Solution
With E(0) < V (0) an interior solution requires Va > Ea for some a. If so, there is a threshold of
ability a such that E(a) = V (a) and Ea(a) > Va(a) so that all i with ai < a do not apply. If
E(a) > V (a) for all ai > a everybody with ai > a will apply. If however there is a value of a such
that E(a) = V (a¯), it must be that and Ea(a¯) < Va(a¯) and such that only i with a < ai < a apply.
B.2 Comparative statics with respect to M
Result 1: Increasing material benefits M will attract higher ability applicants who would not apply
otherwise ( ∂a∂M > 0) and either (i) lower the ability of the lowest ranked applicant (
∂a
∂M < 0) and
increase the total number of applicants or (ii) discourage low ability applicants ( ∂a∂M > 0) and have
an ambiguous impact on the total number.
To prove the first statement, note that the total differential of E(a) = V (a¯) implies da¯dM =
EM
(Va−Ea) . The denominator is positive since Ea(a¯) < Va(a¯); the numerator is equal to EM =
pM (a¯)U(.)+pUM . The first term captures the effect ofM on the probability of being selected, which
depends on the relative ability of the applicant vs. the other applicants; it is therefore zero for the
marginal applicant because this always gets selected. The second term is positive by the assumption
that utility is increasing in material rewards. Thus EM>0 and da¯dM =
EM
(Va−Ea) > 0. Likewise,
da
dM =
EM
(Va−Ea) . The denominator is negative since Ea(a) > Va(a), and again the numerator is
equal to EM = pM (a)U(.) + pUM . The first term is negative because an applicant with skill a is
less likely to be selected under high M since, as seen above, this attracts higher ability applicants.
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The second term is positive as discussed above. Thus, if the increase in payoff U is larger than
the discouragement due to lower probability of being selected, then EM = paMU(.) + pUM > 0
which implies that the lower threshold decreases and overall more people apply. In contrast, if
EM = paMU(.) + pUM < 0, then the lower threshold increases, and the effect on the number of
applicants depends on the distribution of a in the population that, in turn, determines whether
the number of low ability applicants who no longer apply is larger than the number of high ability
applicants who only apply with high M.
Result 2: Under any M, the most able applicant is also the most prosocial. An increase in
M leaves the prosociality of the marginal applicant unchanged and has an ambiguous effect on the
prosociality of the average applicant.
Taking the total differential of E(a¯)− V (a¯) with respect to a and s gives Usds+ Uada = Vada.
Hence ds/da = Va−EaEs . Given that Ea(a¯) < Va(a¯) we have ds/da > 0, and the applicant with
the highest a (a¯) has s = 1. This shows that for any M, the most able applicant is also the most
prosocial. As M increases, da¯dM =
EM
(Va−Ea) > 0, the marginal applicant has higher a¯ and the
same s = 1, which proves that an increase in M leaves the prosociality of the marginal applicant
unchanged. Now consider two levels of M, MT > MC . The marginal candidate when M = MT
has ability a(MT ) while when M = MC the marginal candidate has ability a(MC) < a(MT ). Both
candidates have s = 1. Define sˆ the level of s such that E(a(MC), sˆ, MT ) = V (a(MC)) that is the
applicant with ability a(MC) is indifferent between applying at the higher level of M or not. Then
all the candidates who do not apply when M is low and apply when M is high must have s > sˆ,
whilst those who apply when M is low have 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Thus the new applicants increase the mean
prosociality. However all applicants with a < a(MC), whose prosociality was such that they were
indifferent between applying and not when M = MC will be strictly better off when M = MT .
This implies that for any a < a(MC), raising M will attract lower prosociality applicants. The net
effect depends on the relative strength of these two channels and is therefore ambiguous.
C Time Use
We surveyed the health workers in May 2013, nine months after they started working.32 The
survey asked the health workers to report the frequency of emergency visits typically done outside
of working hours. The median health worker does one emergency call per week, and Column 8 of
Table 5 shows that this holds true for health workers in both groups.
The time use survey is designed to collect information on hours worked and the time allocated
to different activities. This allows us to assess whether the differences in performance documented
above are due to differences in time allocation across tasks—namely, whether treatment health
workers do more visits because they devote more time to that task. To collect information on the
latter, health workers were given 50 beans and asked to allocate the beans in proportion to the
32To implement this survey, we took advantage of a refresher course organized by the Government in the health
worker school in Ndola. Of the 307 health workers, 298 (97%, equally split by treatment group) came to training and
took part in the survey.
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time devoted to each activity within each task. Besides household visits, community meetings, and
time at the health post, we allow for two further activities: traveling and meeting with supervisors.
For each activity, we calculate the share of time devoted to each activity by dividing the number of
beans allocated to that activity by the total number of beans allocated to all activities. The share
of time allocated to these five activities is .32, .22, .16, .22 and .09, respectively. We then estimate
a system of equations for hours worked and share of time devoted to each task, omitting traveling.
Table A.4 reports our findings.
Column 1 shows that the average health worker reports working 43 hours per week in the typical
week and that there is no difference in reported working hours by treatment. This suggests that
health workers in the control group do not compensate for visiting fewer households by devoting
more hours to other, possibly informal, tasks. It also provides further assurance that health workers
in the career treatment do not have differential incentives to overstate their contribution, as self-
reported hours are unverifiable and hence easy to “game.”
Columns 2-5 show that health workers in the two groups allocate their time in a similar man-
ner; thus, observed performance differences are not driven by differences in time allocation. Two,
potentially complementary, explanations are possible. First, treatment health workers might work
more effective hours—e.g., by taking shorter breaks over the 43 weekly hours. Second, treatment
health workers might be more efficient at their jobs. These effects might be strengthened by peer
externalities because each health worker works alongside another health worker hired through the
same treatment. Thus health workers in the treatment group are more likely to have a highly pro-
ductive peer than health workers in the control group. Peer effects might be driven by imitation,
social comparison or a perception that the other health worker competes for the same promotion.
Finally, Table A.5 tests whether health workers in the two groups allocate their time differently
within each activity, namely whether they have different work “styles.” Panel A shows that health
workers in the treatment group devote more time to counseling, inspections, and visiting sick
household members, but, taken one-by-one, these differences are small and not precisely estimated.
Health workers in the treatment group devote 1.6% less time to filling in forms and receipts and
submitting SMSs, but the difference is not precisely estimated at conventional levels. Because the
quality of reports is the same, this implies that career health workers are more productive at this
task. Panel B shows a similar pattern for time allocation during work at the health post: collecting
data and filling in reports is an important component of the job, which takes 23% of the health
workers’ time in the control group, but only 18% in the career treatment. As with household visits,
there is no evidence that health workers in the career treatment collect less data at the health post
level or that these data are of worse quality. Health workers in the two groups are equally likely
to submit HMIS reports in a given month, and these are equally accurate. Thus, the evidence
suggests that health workers in the career treatment are more productive, and this frees time for
other tasks.
47
D Data Appendix
In this section, we describe each of the variables used in our analysis, including its source and unit
of measurement. We collect data at each stage of the program: application, selection, training,
and performance in the field. A description of each source, including the sample, can be found in
Section E.
Eligible population and catchment area characteristics
• Number of staff in health post (source: district health officials survey, by phone) - Total number
of nurses, environmental health technicians, and clinical officers assigned to the health post,
as reported by district health officials we surveyed by phone.
• Geographical distribution of households in catchment area (source: health worker survey, in
person, at refresher training) - Health workers were shown stylized maps and asked to choose
the one that most closely resembled the catchment area of their health post. Questions were
asked to each health worker individually so that two health workers from the same health
post could give different answers. For the 5 out of 161 cases in which the two health workers
gave different answers, we used information provided by supervisors to break the tie.
• Poor cell network coverage (source: attempted phone calls) - We attempted to call all health
workers after deployment. We made daily calls for 118 consecutive days. The health post
was classified as having poor coverage if we did not manage to reach either of its two health
workers during this period.
Experiment Validation
• Relative weight variables (source: health worker survey, in person, at training) - These were
derived from survey questions that asked the trainees to allocate 50 beans between different
potential reasons for applying to the health worker position: “good future career,” “allows
me to serve the community,” “earns respect and high status in the community,” “pays well,”
“interesting job,” “allows me to acquire useful skills,” and “offers stable income.”
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• Expects to be employed in MoH in 5-10 years (source: health worker survey, in person, at
interview) - Circled any combination of being a “community health worker,” “nurse,” “en-
vironmental health technician,” “clinical officer,” or “doctor” in response to the question,
“When you envision yourself in 5-10 years’ time, what do you envision yourself doing?”
Performance in Service Delivery
Household Visits
Source: SMS Receipts
• Unique households visited
• Number of visits per household
• Average visit duration, in minutes
Source: HMIS (monthly reports)
Each reported variable is the sum of each indicator’s monthly values from September 2012 to
January 2014.
• Number of households visited
• Number of women and children visited per household visit
• Number of patients seen at health post
• Number of community mobilization meetings
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Time Use
Source: health worker survey, in person, at refresher training
• Number of hours worked in a typical week - Health workers were asked “In a typical week, how
many total hours do you spend doing health worker work? Please count work that you do at
the health post and in the village, including moving from household to household.”
• Frequency of out-of-hours calls in a typical week - Health workers were asked “In a typical week,
how often do you have to leave your house at night and do CHW work due to emergencies
like pregnancies or accidents?” Possible responses were “5-7 days per week,” “3-4 days per
week,” “1-2 days per week,” “2-3 times per month,” “Once per month,” “Sometimes, but less
than once per month,” and “Never.”
• Share of time allocated to - To obtain time allocations, health workers were asked to allocate
50 beans between different activities. The instructions were as follows:
Please use the beans to show how much time you spend doing each activity. If you spend more
time in an activity, you should place more beans on the card. If you never do an activity, you
should place no beans on the card. Place the beans any way you would like. For instance, you
can place all beans on one card, or 0 beans on any card.
Household visits - Now I would like you to think about household visits specifically. Here are
some cards that list different activities you may do during household visits.
– greeting household members
– assessing and referring sick household members
– reviewing and discussing the household’s health profile and goals
– asking questions about household health behaviors and knowledge
– providing health counseling
– doing household inspections (waste disposal, latrines, etc.)
– documentation (filling registers/books and sending visit receipts via SMS)
Health Post - Now here are some cards that list different activities you may do at the HEALTH
POST OR RURAL HEALTH center.
– seeing sick patients at the OPD
– dispensing medications from the pharmacy
– helping with ANC visits
– cleaning and maintaining the facility
– assisting with deliveries and other procedures when needed
– documentation (filling registers/books and sending monthly reports through HMIS)
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In the Community - Now here are some cards that list different activities you may do as a
health worker.
– campaigns for polio, measles, child health, and other health issues
– health talks and other community mobilization activities
– school health talks and other school activities
– meeting with NHC and volunteer CHWs for planning
Health workers’ observable traits
Skills
• Average test score at training [0-100] - Average score in 11 tests on basic medical practices
taken during the training program.
• O-levels total exam score (source: MOH application files) - This variable is constructed as the
sum of inverted O-levels scores (1=9, 2=8, and so on) from all subjects in which the applicant
wrote the exam, so that larger values correspond to better performance.
• O-levels passed in biology and other natural sciences (source: MOH application files) - Includes
biology, chemistry, physics, science, and agricultural science.
Applicants’ Preferences and Motivations
• Donation to local hospital (dictator game) (source: baseline survey) - In the modified dictator
game, trainees were given 25,000 Kwacha (approximately USD 5; half of a health worker’s
daily earnings) and invited to donate any portion (including nothing) to the local hospital
to support needy patients. This donation decision occurred privately and confidentially in
concealed donation booths. Previous work has found dictator games adapted for specific
beneficiary groups predictive of performance on pro-social tasks (Ashraf et al. 2014).
I am happy to inform you that we have recently received a small donation from an outside donor to support
the Community Health Assistants. In a moment, you will each receive an equal portion of this outside donation.
While the money is yours to keep, the donor has also requested that we provide you with an opportunity for
you to share this gift with the community. This is an opportunity to support people in this community who are
sick but are unable to afford the health care that they need. As you know, there are many such people in the
communities from where you come from and also here in Ndola. They get sick, but because they are very poor,
they are not able to get the health care that they need.
Because we want to protect your privacy, we have set up a donation booth in the next room. There you will
see a collection box where you can deposit your donation, if you choose to donate. You do not have to give
anything if you don’t want to. No one here will know if you decide not to give anything. Your donation will be
recorded, but we will not have access to this information. Once everyone has had an opportunity to give, IPA
will collect any donations made to this cause, and we will donate the total amount to Ndola Central Hospital to
directly support patients who are unable to pay for their medicines and treatment.
In a moment, we will give you the money, and you will come to this desk where you will be able to donate to
help needy patients if you wish.
I am happy to announce now that the donor is able to provide each of you with 25,000 Kwacha.
In a moment, I will ask each of you to come to the registration table one-by-one. When you come to the
table, that is when I will give you the money. I will also give you an envelope in case you want to support the
patients at Ndola Central Hospital.
51
If you want to give any amount of money to help needy patients in the community, place the money in the
envelope. Then seal the envelope, and place that envelope in the “Help Needy Patients in the Community” box.
Please be sure to place the money INSIDE the envelopes before placing it in the cash box. Do not put any loose
bills into the cash box. Whatever money you have remaining, you can keep in your main envelope.
• Main goal is “service to community” vs. “career advancement” (source: baseline survey) -
Asked of all trainees: “In terms of your new health worker position, which is more important
to you?” with two possible responses: “serving community” and “promoting career.”
• Perceives community interests and self-interest as overlapping (source: health worker survey,
in person, at interview) - Based on the “Adapted Inclusion of Others in Self (IOS) scale”
(Aron et al. 2004), which measures the extent to which individuals perceive community- and
self-interest as overlapping. The Inclusion of Other in the Self scale was originally designed
by Dr. Art Aron and colleagues (Aron et al. 1992) as a measure of self-other inclusion and
relationship closeness. The Continuous IOS makes use of the basic design of the original
IOS,33 but allows for (a) the measure to be embedded within a web-based questionnaire,
(b) the output values to be continuously scaled, and (c) modifications in the appearance
and behavior of the measure. IOS has been validated across a wide variety of contexts, and
adapted versions are found to be strongly correlated with environmental behavior (Schmuck
and Schultz 2012) and connectedness to the community (Mashek et al. 2007). The measure
is coded as 0-1, where 1 implies highest overlap. Applicants are asked to choose between sets
of pictures, each showing two circles (labeled “self” and “community”) with varying degrees
of overlap, from non-overlapping to almost completely overlapping. This variable equals 1 if
the respondent chooses the almost completely overlapping picture (D), 0 otherwise.
• Aims to be a higher-rank health professional in 5-10 years (source: health worker survey, in
person, at interview) - Circled any combination of being an “environmental health technician,”
“clinical officer,” or “doctor” in response to the question, “When you envision yourself in 5-10
years’ time, what do you envision yourself doing?”
Psychometric Scales
Each measure (source: baseline survey) takes on a value between 1 and 5 and represents, among the
statements listed below, the extent to which the applicant agreed, on average. Levels of agreement
33http://www.haverford.edu/psych/ble/continuous_ios/originalios.html
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are 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 (agree), and 5 (strongly
agree). The psychometric scales came from validated scales used in employment surveys on pro-
social motivation and career orientation. Each variable is the average of the item scores within each
psychometric scale. For instance, in a scale with three items, the variable value equals the sum of
levels of agreement for all items divided by three. It represents the average level of agreement with
the included items.
• Career orientation - Adapted from Wrzesniewski et al. (1997). In contrast to Calling below,
individuals with high career orientation tend to have a deeper personal investment in their
work and mark their achievements not only through monetary gain, but through advancement
within the occupational structure. This advancement often brings higher social standing,
increased power within the scope of one’s occupation, and higher self-esteem for the worker
(Bellah et al. 1988). This scale consists of the following items: “I expect to be in a higher-level
job in five years,” “I view my job as a stepping stone to other jobs,” and “I expect to be doing
the same work as a health worker in five years” (reverse-scored).
• Pro-social motivation (pleasure-based) - Adapted from Grant (2008) and consists of the follow-
ing items: “Supporting other people makes me very happy,” “I do not have a great feeling
of happiness when I have acted unselfishly” (reverse-scored), “When I was able to help other
people, I always felt good afterwards,” and “Helping people who are not doing well does not
raise my own mood” (reverse-scored).
• Desire for positive pro-social impact - Adapted from Grant (2008). This measure provides
an index of the degree to which an individual desires and benefits psychologically from the
positive impact of her work on others. The scale consists of the following items: “It is
important to me to do good for others through my work,” “I care about benefiting others
through my work,” “I want to help others through my work,” “I want to have positive impact
on others through my work,” “I get motivated by working on tasks that have the potential to
benefit others,” “I like to work on tasks that have the potential to benefit others,” “I prefer
to work on tasks that allow me to have a positive impact on others,” “I do my best when
I’m working on a task that contributes to the well-being of others,” “It is important to me to
have the opportunity to use my abilities to benefit others,” “It is important to me to make a
positive difference in people’s lives through my work,” “At work, I care about improving the
lives of other people,” and “One of my objectives at work is to make a positive difference in
other people’s lives.”
• Affective commitment to beneficiaries - Adapted from Grant (2008) and answers the following
question: “How much do I care about/committed to the beneficiaries of my work?” The scale
consists of the following items: “The people who benefit from my work are very important to
me,” and “The people who benefit from my work matter a great deal to me.”
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E Data Sources
• Source: Application (sample: all applicants) - Applications were submitted from August-
September 2010. The initial application stage was comprised of the initial application form,
which includes fields for gender, date of birth, village of residence, and educational qualifica-
tions. The application form also included a question asking through what means the applicant
first learned of the health worker job opportunity: recruitment poster, facility health worker,
community health worker, government official, word-of-mouth, or “other.”
• Source: Interview Candidate Questionnaire (sample: subset of applicants called for an
interview) - Ranking questionnaires were filled and collected from September to October 2010.
If applicants met the basic criteria noted above, they were invited for interviews, and asked
to complete a questionnaire on the interview day. The questionnaire (written in English)
included a series of questions about the interviewee’s demographic background, community
health experience, social capital, and work preferences and motivations. Notably, we included
a measure employed by social psychologists, “Inclusion of Others in Self” (Aron et al. 2004)
to measure connection with the community. The questionnaire stated that the answers would
not be used for selection purposes but rather as part of a research project, although we cannot
rule out that panelists could have seen the questionnaire or referred to it when making their
decisions.
• Source: Ranking Sheet (sample: members of interview panels) - Ranking sheets were filled
and collected from September to October 2010. Each panel consisted of five members: the
district health officer, a representative from the health center, and three neighborhood health
committee members. Once all interviews were completed, every member of the selection panel
completed a private and individual ranking sheet by ranking their top ten candidates. This
ranking exercise occurred before panel members formally deliberated and discussed the can-
didates. After interviewing all candidates and deliberating, interview panels were requested
to complete and submit a consensus-based “Selection Panel Report” that included fields for
the two nominated candidates as well as three alternates.
• Source: Baseline Survey (sample: all trainees) - The baseline survey was conducted in
June 2011 and consisted of five components:
1. Questionnaire - Conducted one-on-one by a surveyor and collected information on the
trainees’ socio-economic background and livelihoods, motivations to apply, and expec-
tations of the program.
2. Psychometric scales - A self-administered written exercise which gathered alternative in-
formation on motivations to apply, determinants of job satisfaction, and other character
traits.
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3. Modified dictator game - An experimental game whereby students received a small do-
nation and were given the opportunity to give some of it back for a good cause. It
explored the altruistic nature of the students.
4. Coin game - An experimental game that explored the risk-taking behavior of the stu-
dents.
5. Self-assessment - A three-hour exam with multiple choice questions to determine the
knowledge on health matters that each student had prior to the training.
• Source: Catchment Area Survey (sample: all deployed CHWs and supervisors) - Just
prior to graduation in July 2012, all CHWs and supervisors were given a short survey that
asked about characteristics of their health posts, including population density, rainy-season
information, and general community health measures.
• Source: Time Use Survey (sample: all deployed CHWs) - This survey was conducted in
April/May 2013 in Ndola, Zambia. The respondents were pilot health workers who reported to
Ndola for a supplemental in-service training to introduce new tasks as part of a revised health
worker scope of work. The survey was administered by Innovations for Poverty Action, in
partnership with the Ministry of Health, the Health Worker Training School, and the Clinton
Health Access Initiative.
• Source: SMSs (sample: all deployed health workers) - All health workers carry with them
receipt books for each visit, which require the signature of the client visited. The information
on these receipts—consisting of the data, time, and duration of the visit, as well as the client’s
phone number—is then SMS’ed in real time to the MoH and our central data-processing
facility.
F District Instruction Appendix
The health worker program was introduced differently to health centers depending on the treatment
group. In each district, the district health official was given a package that contained a script, a
memo from the Permanent Secretary, and detailed instructions about the health worker recruitment
process. In addition, district health officials received “health center packages” for each participating
health center in the district, which contained a set of posters and application forms and instructions
for the health center representative on how to post posters and collect applications. The district
health officials were to visit each health center and meet with the staff and neighborhood health
committee members to introduce the program and distribute the health center packages, using
the script provided to them in their packages. The script was only provided to the district health
officials, and was addressed directly to them. It is unlikely that the applicants or health center staff
were able to read this script themselves.
The following script was given to district health officials in the career-incentives treatment
group:
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To Health center and Neighborhood Health Committee: I would like to you let you know
about a new government program to strengthen the country’s health workforce. Applica-
tions are currently being accepted for a new Community Health Worker position. This
is an opportunity for qualified Zambians to obtain employment and to advance their
health careers. Opportunities for training to advance to positions such as Nurse and
Clinical Officer may be available in the future. Successful applicants will receive 1 year
of training, both theoretical and practical. All training costs, including transportation,
meals and accommodation during the one-year training program, will be covered by the
Ministry of Health. Please encourage all qualified persons to apply so that they can
benefit from this promising career opportunity.
The district health officials in the control group received the following script:
To Health center and Neighborhood Health Committee: I would like to you let you know
about a new government program to improve health care services in your community.
Applications are currently being accepted for a new Community Health Worker position.
This is an opportunity for local community members to become trained and serve the
health needs of their community. The new CHWs will work at the Health Post and
community level in coordination with an affiliated Health center. Successful applicants
will receive 1 year of training, both theoretical and practical. All training costs, including
transportation, meals and accommodation during the one-year training program, will be
covered by the Ministry of Health. Please encourage all qualified persons to apply so
that they can benefit from this promising community service opportunity.
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